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Moral Philosophy, Information Technology,
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The Grokster Case1
Wendy]. Gordon

INTRODUCTION

A plethora of philosophical issues arise where copyright and patent laws
intersect with information technology. Given the necessary brevity of the
chapter, my strategy will be to make general observations that can be applied
to illuminate one particular issue. I have ch osen the issue considered in
MGM v. Grokster, 2 a recent copyright case from the U.S. Supreme Court
Grokster, Ltd., provided a decentralized peer-to-peer technology that many
people, typically students, used to copy and distribute music in ways that
violate d copyright law. The Supreme Court addressed the extent to which
Grokster and other technology providers should be held responsible (under
a theory of 'secondary liability') for infringements done by others who use
the technology.
In its Groksteropinion, the U.S. Supreme Court ducked difficult questions
about the consequences of imposing liability on such a technology provider,
and instead chose to invent a new doctrine that imposed secondary liability
on the basis of a notion of 'intent'. The judges have been accused ofsidestepping immensely difficult empirical questions and instead taking the' easy way
o ut' (Wu 2005, p. 241). This chapter asks if the Court's new doctrinal use of
'intent' is in fact as deeply flawed as critics contend. To examine the issue,
the chapter employs two broadly defined ethical approaches to suggest~
interpretation of what the Court may have been trying to do. The first 15
one that aims at impersonally maximizing good consequences; the chapter
' Copyright 0 2007 by Wendy J. Gordon. For commen ts on the manuscript, I thank Iskra
Fileva, David Lyons, Russell Hardin, Ken Simons, Lior Zcmer, the members of the Boston
University Faculty Workshop, and the editors of this volume. For helpful discussion, 1 ~
Scana Shiffrin, and I also thank the audience at the Intellectual Property Section oflhe 2
Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, where a version of the (',ro/ullr
discussion was presented. Responsibility for all errors, of course, rests with me.
t Metrr>-CoUJ:wyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. GroksUT; LUI., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764 ( 2 005).
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uses the term 'consequentialist' for this approach. The second is neither
maximizing nor impersonal; the chapter uses the term 'deontological ' for
this second approach.
The chapter addresses the role 'intent' can play in each category. The
chapter then draws out implications for the Grokster case, arguing that the
Court neither fully explored the consequentialist issues, nor provided an
adequate account of its nonconsequentialist approach.3 The chapter then
draws on a deontological strand in John Locke's theories of property to
see what might be said in defe nse of the Court's approach in Orokster. It
concludes that Lockean theory fails to provide a justification for the Court's
approach, and that the critics (notably Tim Wu) are right. T he Court's mode
of analysis in Grokster still stands in need ofjustification.

CONSEQUENTIALISM

The overall topic of this chapter is to examine the moral implications that
computers and the Internet ho ld for copyright. At first, this seems like an
odd question. We think of morality as independent of happenstance, so how
can a change in technology alter one's moral judgments about whether a
given act is wrong or right?
One response is to examine whether one's moral judgments are indeed
indcpendeut of circumstance. There is a species of morality, consequentialism, which m akes the rightness or wrongness of an action depend on
outcomes. One is even tempted to say that for consequentialists (such as
Benthamite utilitarians") morality is totally dependent on circumstance.
But that would be an overstatemen t. Consequentialists must answer crucial questions whose answers cannot be ' read off factual reality the way we
can ' read off' the color of paint simply by looking at it. For example, consider
this question: what kind of consequences should count (pleasure? progress?
what about sadistic pleasures, or material progress that dehumanizes?). Such
questions are answered by moral reasoning. Although the reaso ner's conditions of life (some of which will be happenstance) will inevitably color
her moral reasoning, circumstances do not 'dictate' what their moral significance or insignificance will be - the reasoner chooses which circumstances
will count, and why.
$

4

In stipulating these defini tions, I follow an old pattern: ' For the last two centuries ethicists
have focused, almost exclusively, on just two th eoretical possibilities: deontology [i.e., agentrelative nonconsequentialism] and utilitarianism [i.e., agent·neutral consequentialism]'
(Portmore 2001, p. 372). The landscape of today's ethical theory is of course more complex. Nevenheless, these two classic possib ilities will suffice to illuminate the unsatisfactory
nature of the rea'IOning in the Oroluter decision.
Although there are nonutilitarian consequentialist theories, this ch apter will generally focus
on Benthamite utilitarianism.
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One might ad op t a consequentialist approach that seeks to maximize the
welfare of only a limited grou p of people- a society's aristocrats, say, or one's
se)f.5 But most consequentialist theories treat all persons as equals, and the
'good' that each person experiences (h owever 'good ' is defined) has equal
moral importance to the 'good' any other person experiences. It is the total
good that most consequentialists seek to maximize. Consequentialism can
be seen as combining a theory of value with a theory about how its promotio n
is related to rightness or o bligation. 6
It is sometimes said that consequentialists are 'agent neutral' in ways that
some nonconsequentialists are not,7 in the sense that reasons for action are
agent-neutral in most conseq ue ntialist theories,8 not varying with who one
is. Thus, in Benthamite and other kinds of maximizing consequentialism,
everyone has the same duty to maxim ize the net of good over bad results,
and our positions affect only our abilities to execute the duty. By contrast,
'agent-relative' theories include notions of duty that vary with the identity
of the persons involved. ' Deontological reasons have their full force against
your doing something- not j ust against its happening' accordi ng to Nagel
(1986, p. i77).
For example, in the com mands, 'honor thy father and thy mother' or
'respect your teachers', I am an agent who owes a d u ty to my paren ts and
teachers that you, as a differently situated agent, do not have. The duty is
'mine'. Even if you are in a position to affect the welfare of my parents
or teach ers more directly than I am, an agent-rela tive ap proach would not
impose upon you a duty of the same kind I have toward them. You would
have a duty to th em simply as persons, not as parents or teachers, and on an
agent-relative view you probably owe them less - or something d ifferent than I d o.9
Similarly, 'agent-relative' theories may be sensitive to what individuals do.
The person who copies a work of au thorship may morally owe something
to the author that would not be owed by a third party who h as not hims~lf
copied the authored work. The act of the copyist could distinguish him
from the party who has not chosen to make such a copy. Yet, the copyist ~ay
be hard to locate, while the copyright owner might easi ly identify a third
For an overview, see Frankcna ( 1988).
I am indebted to David Lyons for this last sentence.
7 Discussion here is indebted to Thomas Nagel ( 1986, pp. 165-188).
.
8
I am obviously simplifying the discussion. Some consequentialist theor ies are agent-relauve,
and some deontologicaJ theories are agent-neutral. See, for example, Broome 1995, P· 6 · 1°
the Orokstercasc, the Court indicated th at copyright law should treat cwo different technology
providers d ifferently depending on their intent (an agent-relative consideration). Thus, t~e
Court's approach could impose liability on one technology pro\>ider because it had a paruc0
ular 'intent', and free another from liability ifit lacked the 'intent', even if the constqtttn_": f
putting liability on the two technologies would be the same. This is a n agent-relative posiuon.
9 I use the example ofobligations to relatives for ease of exposition. Nagel ( 1986, P· 165) noces
that obligations to such persons might not ' resist agent-neutral justification'·
5
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party- perhaps an Internet service provider, perhaps an entity like Napster
or Grokster- possessed ofsome potential leverage that could be exerted over
the controverted activity. Nevertheless, under 'agent-relative' approaches,
the fact that the third-party technology provider could be located, and was
well situated to change copying behavior, would not in itself justify a duty on
the technology provider; additional questions about what constituted good
grounds for responsibility would need to be asked.
By contrast, under an 'agent-neutral' theory, the questions would be complex also, but much of the complexity would be empirical in nature; moral
duties and rights would be arranged according to how best to achieve a
chosen goal. For example, if the goal was to encourage authorship, and if to
accomplish this goal peer-to-peer copying had to be discouraged (a big and
controversial 'if), then under an agent-neutral approach, moral duties to
monitor or to pay might be placed on the third-party technology provider,
or even on a more distant enthy, if somehow that entity had the power to
con trol copying.
For an example of such distant entities, consider Guido Calabresi's observation about who should bear the costs of automobile accidents. Judge
Calabresi noted that if an 'arbitrary third party, e.g., television manufacturers', were somehow situated so that they were the people best able to
e ffectuate accident-avoiding precautions, from a consequentialist perspective it would be appropriate to put liability for auto accidents upon the television manufacturers rather than upon speeding drivers (Calabresi 1970,
p. t 36). 10 Similarly, if speeding drivers, or any other third party, were somehow situated so that they were the people best able to encourage the composition of art works and computer progra ms, a consequentialist might argue
for g iving copyright ownership to them rather than to auth ors.
It strains our credulity to imagine that this could happen. Even if drivers
could somehow bribe or threaten artist'> and programmers to work harder,
giving copyright ownership to drivers is less likely to be productive than
giving copyright ownership to the people who make the works of authorship. But our incredulity at possible results does not mean that Benthamite
consequentialism is wrong.
To the contrary: according to followers ofJeremy Bentham, it is just the
low odds of such bizarre possibilities (such as te levision makers having more
ability to control traffic safety than drivers do, or drivers having more ability
to control television content than 1V producers do) that create our senses of
expectation and incredulity. The likely coincidence between consequentialist result and commonsense notions of responsibility, Bentham would say,
makes us miss the consequentialist basis of our commonsense notions. Thus,
lhose notions may be conditioned patterns of stimulus-response, rather than
1

° Calabrcsi ( 1970, pp. 136-152) goes on

to explain why such an 'arbitrary third party' is
unlikely to be appropriately situated for such imposition of liability Lo be effective.
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morally-reliable guides. A consequentialist would argue that, ifand when circumstances change, we need to be ready to change our notions of responsibility and desert. A person who has the ability lO control the behavior of
another may be as good a candidate for consequentialist moral duty as is
the actor himself - or even a better candidate. Under a consequentialist
approach, the law might make the producers of a new technology liable
for copyright infringements that third parties accomplished through use of
th e technology, even if under some deon tological notions, the technologists
would seem to lack personal responsibility.
A consequentialist approach can therefore drive a wedge between usual
notions of cause and effect, or at least, change our notion of how we should
give moral attribution to cause and effect. Instead of asking questions like,
'you did harm, do you deserve to pay damages?', or 'you created a benefit, do
you deserve to be rewarded?', we ask, 'what kinds ofrules 11 about damages
and rewards would create, in the long run, the greatest excess of good over
bad consequences.'
That an actor intends something to happen has no per se importance for
a consequentialist analysis. This is not to deny that intent can be relevant to
the extent that intent changes consequences; among other things, intention
can make something more likely to occur (Simons 1992). 12 But intention in
itself does not make an act rightful or wrongful for a consequentialist; from
most consequentialist perspectives, whether the act is rightful or wrongful
depends on its results. By contrast, many deontological views emphasize the
wrongfulness of intentionally doing harm to another (Nagel ig86), even if
doing the harmful act has substantial beneficial effects.
Consequentialist approaches to copyright typically have two primai:>'
emphases - inducing creativity and encouraging dissemination of what is
created. The divergence between consequentialist and nonconsequential·
ist approaches can be visualized if we consider the case of the compulsive
creator. 13
11

In this chapler, I elide the differences between acl and rule utilitarianism, and many other
subtleties.
" Regarding mental state, Kennelh Simons ( 1992, p. 504 ) summarizes 'six significant conclu·
sions of utilitarian and economic analyses' as follows:
· ( 1) If an actor's mental state reflects a grealer likelihood of success in causing harm.
a higher sanction is warranted in order to deter him; (2) If an aclor lacks a minimal
awareness of the nature or likely results of his conduct, he cannol be deterred and
should not be punished; (3) lf a mental stale reflects a higher private benefil to lhe
actor, a higher sanction is necessary lo deter him; (4 ) Some mental stales, such as
sadistic desires, reflect a private benefit lhat lacks social value; (5) Criminalizing so~e
men ta1 st.ales would create 'sleering dear' costs, inducing socially costly efforts to avoid
liabilicy; and (6) Inflicting harm wilh an aggravaled mental stale sometimes thereby
aggravates the harm lO lhe victim.'
1
3 There is a parallel case of the compulsive bad driver. If nolhing we can do will make the
bad driver slow down - it might be belter lo encourage the pedestrians and all lhe other
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According to most accounts, Picasso was a compulsive creator. His hands
would turn out paintings, sculptures, collages, and prints, so long as he
had shelter, supplies and enough energy to work. Let us say that sale of
his individual art works would give him enough money to cover these basic
needs. Should the law give him also the right to profit from people copying
his works?
Commonsense notions of desert suggest that the answer should perhaps
be 'yes'. Yet, from a consequentialist perspective, giving Picasso a right to
control copying would not, ex hypothesis, make him work any harder or
any more creatively. Further, giving Picasso that right would cause fewer
copies to be distributed (and to bring less joy or insight) than would occur
in the absence of giving him such a right. Therefore, a consequentialist
might argue that, so long as an absence of right in Picasso didn't demoralize
other artists into lessening their production •1 and, so long as the institutional costs of distinguishing the Picassos from ordinary creators were not
too high, a prosperous compulsive creator such as Picasso should not have
copyright. Putting Picasso's various collocations of shape and color into the
public domain immediately, for purposes of inexpensive copying and adaptation, would make the society better off than would giving Picasso copyright
in them.
For the consequentialist, then, the key question is, what rule (or choice of
act) will make for better results? The perspective is looking forward, rather
than looking backward at who has done what.
Thus, the copyright consequentialist begins not by asking questions that
look backward, such as, 'Who created this work of art?', but rather questions,
such as this, that look forward: 'To whom should we give rights in this if we
want to encourage creativi ty in the future?' or 'How should we allocate
rights in this if we want to encourage happiness (or economic prosperity,
or reciprocal respect among creative people and their audiences, or some
other notion of the good)?'

'

4

drivers to take care - by, for example, making those people bear any costs resulting from
colliding with the bad driver. One might imagine requiring the bad driver to post a badge
of identification on his car that alerts others, that here is someon e who won't have to pay
damages. Of course, this might not work out beneficially in practice for a multitude of
reasons - not least because third alternatives, such as confiscating the bad dri\·er's car, may
be far more effective in reducing accidents than would relieving the compulsively bad driver
of the responsibility to pay damages. But the counterintuitive example - that the worst driver
might be the one we'd relieve of a duty to pay damages - suggests the kind of umethering
from usual notions of desert that consequentialism can cause.
Frank Michelman ( 1g6 7 , p. 116 5 ) has suggested that utilitarians may protect rights more
stringently than some other varieties of moralists because what happens to an individual
can demoralize (i.e., reduce the effectiveness of positive incentives on) onlookers. A demoralization argument might support giving Picasso a copyright, not for his own sake, but for
the sake of the audiences who might benefit from the arts to be produced by persons who,
observing Picasso's fate, will be disheartened.

Wendy J Gordon
In the law of copyright, a person who copies is potentially liable as a
'direct infringe r'. Someone else, who does not directly violate copyright
law, may nevertheless be in a position to affect whether the law is violated.
Deciding whether to make this other person liable is known as the question of 'secondary liability'. 1 5 As will appear, there can be both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist approaches to deciding secondary liability
issues.
SEA CHANGES

So far, our most general point is this: if there is a sea change in the pattern
of likely consequences - and arguably the advent of computers and the
Internet constitutes such a sea change - the utilitarian consequentialist will
alter his recommendation of what acts and rules are likely to be good, and
which bad.
What are some of the sea changes? I will mention some of the grossest
changes, and then proceed to some more subtle.
First, there is a great increase in value of 'content'. A story or song that
could have reached X people in the analog world, can reach X plus Ypeople
now, and, with each additional person reached, the value they experience
adds to the world's stock of value. This potential increase in the world's stock
of 'good' may shift preexisting balances.
Second, the union ofd igitization and the In tern et causes arguably greatc::r
vulnerability to unconsented copying. Not only is copying and distribution
easy; enforcemcn tis difficult. Because of the privacy with which one typically
employs computers, and because copying by computer is so widespread that
any individual faces a low chance of being sued, potentially unlawful copying
may increase. 16 Such copying can decrease the value of old markets and the
profitability of o ld business models, and make it difficult for businesses to
capture the same revenues in digital markets.
.
Third, the same union of digitization and Internet causes a drasuc
decrease in the costs of distribution and access. Instead of printing and
binding tons of paper and sending them out in trucks to be purchased in
stores located on expensive real estate, the Internet can distribute works al
minimal or no cost.
'5

16

Sometimes secondary liability can be masked as something else. Thus, 1he U.S. copyri~hl
s1atute includes among the acts that constitute direct infringement, the act of discribuung
the copyrighted work to the public: 17 USC§ 106(3). A store owner who doesn .t realize ht'
is sellin g unl awful copies is nevertheless guilty of ~olating the distribution right. Congress
could have relied on secondary liability as a basis for copyright owners going after store
owners who sell unlaY>ful copies; by instead using a 'distribution· right, Congress made tht'
store owners' liability primary, and made it easier for plaintiffs to take action.
Sec also Moor ( 1985, p. 266) for a discussion of aspects of computer use that may affect
e th ics.
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Because it is hard to know, empirically, what the 'best' mixture of activities might be, some commentators have reasoned from the status q uo that
prevailed before the ubiquity of the personal computer. One might compare
the postdigital with the predigital world. •7
From this vantage point, consider the three major developments I have
mentioned. First, consider the increase in the monetary value ofcopyrighted
works. The increase means that the same amount of money can fl ow to
artists, even if the percentage of value they can capture decreases. That
suggests, on the one hand, that post-Internet copyright can safely decrease
the scope of its protection. On the other hand, the potential increase in
all works' social value may warrant a n increase in authorial productivity,
and conceivably authors would create more or better works if the amount
of money they received were increased. There is undoubtedly an upper
limit o n this responsiveness; an infinite amount of royalties will not produce
an infinite supply of perfect works. 18 Nevertheless, the two forces pull in
somewhat different directions; the Internet-induced increase in monetary
value means that authors will retai n their status-quo revenues even if their
ability to e mploy copyright is decreased, but the increase in monetary value
may mean that authors should begin obtaining more than their status-quo
revenues, in order to induce an increase in the number of works.
Second, consider the increased vulnerability to copying. This may be
tolerable, because the rise in overall value will preserve incentives, even in
the face of decreased per-copy compensation. Or it may be dangerous in
reducing incentives below a desired level. From the latter perspective, some
scholars urge increasing the private use of contractual limits and 'automated
rights management' technologies to limit copying (Bell 1998), or increasing
centralized legal con trols over copying technology. 19 By contrast, wri ters like
Julie Cohen point ou t that securing additional protections for copyrig h t
owners will affect users in negative ways that prior regimes did not - and
erod e effective access to the public domain as well. :w
17

This is a methodology used by Trotter Hardy, to quite difTcrcm results {Hanly 2002,
pp. 226-228).
111
See Glynn Lunney ( 1996, p. 483) for an intriguing discussion of other reason~ why it would
be unwise for the law to seek to give copyright owners all the 'alue that their efforts generate.
19
Thus, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) supplements technological barriers.
The DMCA makes it unlawful to make or circulate technology that enables consumers LO
bypass cryp tolopes and other technological access barriers that block acces.~ LO copyrigh ted
work. Similarly, as I will discuss, there is pressure to make copying technologies themscl\'CS
liable for copying. On this developmem, see Trotter Hardy (1996, pp. 24g-l!52).
~.. See Julie Cohen ct al. (2002, p. 10) and Cohen (2005, p. 34i)· Decentralized methods
such as contracts are not only available to make cop}ing harder. They also can be usecl for
the opposite result. Richard Stallman (2002) has shown individual copyright owners how
to use co mract (and copyright law) to make sharing conditionally mandatory. (Sec also
the material collected by the GNU Project at http://www.gnu.org/ p hilosophy/ .) Under a
'copyleft' license of the kind Stallman de\'eloped, the author of a computer program can

Wendy J. Gorcum
Third, consider the decrease in the costs of distribution and access. In
the past, much copyright revenue has been used to cover those costs. For
example, as between music companies and composers or performers, the
music companies often receive the bulk of the revenue. If distribution costs
are drastically reduced by the Internet, and the costs of printing or making
CDs are shifted to the home user, copyright and its associated revenues may
be less necessary (see, for example, Litman 2004).
A host of more subtle effects are also occurring. For example, copyright law impacts on individuals in their homes and friendships in new,
unexpected ways (Lange 2003, Palmer 2002). Acts that feel natural and
community-building (such as sharing) may for the first time be prohibited.
Old behaviors may become no longer acceptable as laws change, and as
familiar choices (like a decision to share) :.!I take on a digital form (Litman
1994, 2004).
In addition, the advent of computers and Internet causes a change in
the 'fit' of law. Copyright law was adapted to commercial users, and is iUequipped for noncommercial copiers (Litman 2001}. The question arises,
whether this new lack of 'fit' changes whatever might otherwise be a prima
facie moral obligation to obey the law.:.!:.e
Much of the debate revolves around the private person, sitting at home
with his or her computer, deciding whether to make a copy of something
she purchased (such as a music CD) or something she obtained from the
Internet. The legal status of space-shifting. sampling, or individual downloading, is still somewhat murky, even in the United States (Cohen 2005,
p. 347).
A consequentialist would ask about effects. For example, will putting a
restraint on a home copyist increase the likelihood of creativity, and will that
be worth more than the costs? The costs include the decrease in access, the
decrease in follow-on activity, the increase in home surveillance, the loss of
a sense of control over one's CD and computer, the loss of spontaneity, and
the loss of a sense of 'protected space' at home.

2
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specify that she grants permissions to anyone to copy and adapt her program - but she
makes this permission conditional on the next person's imposing the same license on all
those who wish to copy and adapt downstream.
For example: sending our copy of an interesting book to a friend does not violate the
copyright owner's 'distribution right' because any owner of a lawfully made copy ~as. a
liberty to give, sell, or rent that copy. See t7 USC§ tog. This liberty, a product of I.he hmtts
that the 'first sale doctrine' places on the copyright owner's distribution right, continue~ to
be valuable in the nondigital world. However, in the digital world, sharing an interesung
article Y.i th a friend usually involves copying the article, and in the United States, the fi~t
sale doctrine docs not apply to the cop}'Tight owner's 'right of reproduction·· Although. in
some circumstances, the act of digital sharing might nevertheless be sheltered (as by _the
fair use doctrine), the legal analysis and result may cliffer. Therefore, acts with idenucal
effects (sharing a physical paper copy and sharing a digital copy) may receive different legal
treatment.
On the issue of copyright civil disobedience, see Lunney (:wot, p. 893-g 10).
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court occasionally talks about 'fair return', 2 3
the American copyright and patent systems are generally understood to be
consequentialist in nature. According to the U.S. Constitution , Art. I Cl. 8,
Congress is given power to grant rights 'for limited times' to 'authors and
inventors' to 'promote the progress of Science and the useful arts'. Given the
great uncertainty about the empirical issues, the consequentialist moralist
may turn to issues of process and institutional competence: how expert is
Congress at making these difficult empirical judgments? To what extent
does the legislature deserve our deference on grounds of its superior ability
to process information?
Observers of the copyright lawmaking process in the United States suggest the legislature used liuJe of its potential expertise. J essica Litman, the
'dean of the observational corps', argues that Congress does not make most
copyright policy. Rather, Congress delegates authority to industry actors
who hammer out legislative provisions behind closed doors - provisions
that might accommodate everyone sitting at the table, but it's a table at
which the public rarely sits {Litman 2001 ).
SECONDA RY LIABILITY: T EC H NOLOGY PROVIDERS

One of the most important issues concerns the intersection of copyright
and technology, namely. to what extent should the makers of a technology
that enables copying and distribution be liable as 'secondary infringers'
for the acts of strangers who utilize the technology to commit copyright
infringement? The social stakes are large. Consider, for example, what is at
issue in regard to decentralized peer-to-peer technology.
Distribution and copying tech nologies have great potential for disseminating culture and stimulating new thoughts and new work to come into
being. Particularly when coupled with the Internet, such technologies also
have significant potential for enabling copyright infringement.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the recent Grokster case, had to decide
whether the law should permit or restrain such a technology. 2 4 This is a particularly important question when the technology at issue is (like Grokstds)
a decentralized peer-to-peer system that allows communication among separate computer users who can copy and transmit without having to go
through a central controller or hub. Such a pure peer-to-peer technology
offers potential for preserving privacy and for fostering democratic grassroots development free of Big Brother supervision. 2 5
•3 'The rights conferred by copyrigh1 are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors'. Harpn- & Rou~ Publishm v. Nation Entn-frrises, 471 U.S.
' 539, 546 (1985).
4
" MelrrrGokiwyn·Mnyer Studios hu 11. Crokstn; ltd.. U.S. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) .
•:, In George Orwell's 1984. ' Big Bro1her' was the super ficially paternalistic go\'ernmental
figure that had electronic access to all homes and could stop any talk of dissatisfacrion
before it spread.
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From the perspective of democracy, what kinds of files might one want
to be able to share and send widely? In the United States, one thinks of
the Zapruder film that contained the sole visual recording of the Kennedy
assassination, or of the Pentagon Papers, the multi-volume secret study that
opened the eyes of many regarding the Vietnam War. In considering the
old USSR, one thinks of suppressed texts circulated through samizdat. In
any context, one thinks of evidence, such as records of pollution and corporate cover-ups. To keep our governments honest and our private sectors
responsive, the possibility of private c irculation of truth-material must be
maintained. And as we come increasingly to depend on the Internet for
communication, alternative sources may atrophy, increasing the importance
of keeping the Internet usable.
A devil's advocate might say that the currentjudiciary will protect the circulation of such information , that we needn't preserve special technology
to do so. Thus, in the United States, the New York Times and the Washingt,on
Post published the Pentagon Papers despite governmental opposition.~ 0 and
when the copyright owner of the Zapruder film sued a scholar who copied
it, the defendant was held free of liability under the 'fair use' doctrine. ~;
Therefore (says a devil's advocate), the courts will keep us able to communicate with each other, regardless of whether decentralized and hidden modes
oflnternet communication are available. But we're talking about legal rules
that can control technology for the indefinite future; we are talking about
crafting a structure that might create a permanent block on technology.
Who knows how responsive courts will be to free speech arguments in \'arious nations at various Limes in the future?28
As Lawrence Lessig ( 1999) points out, computer code can be even more
binding than legal code, because it changes the physical world. A law saying 'do not cross this river' is a Jess effective restraint than dismantling the
bridge. In addition, as Lessig recognizes, law can also change the physical
world; law can order the bridge taken down. And once th e bridge is down,
whatever the reasons motivated its destruction, it is unavailable for good
purposes as well. Enjoining decentralized copying and distribution technology may mean that we will have systematically less privacy than we need to
guard our civil liberties and our democracies. So the issues are vital, and the
consequences are of immense importance.
• 6 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 13 ( 1971 ).
•; Timi' foe. ti. Bmwrd Geis Assoc.r., 293 F. Supp. 130 (SONY 1968).
' 11 ln addition, of course, it might be argued that utilitlng the first amendment and related doc·
trin es like 'fair use' involves uncertainty. and resolving that unccnainty requires the ~sc of
expensive lawyers. Thus, Lawrence Lessig sometimes asserts that, ·~Fair use" in America 15 the
i-ight to hirt: a lawyer.' (http://lessig.org/blog/2004 /03/1.alkback_manes.hunl) T he r~s~ilt·
1
ing u11certaincy can chill la\\ful expression. H owever. it is possible to overstaL~ th~ c~ 1 ~ "~!
effect of copyright law. The recent Docum=tary Fibnmakers •Statement of&st Prrut1us zn faz;C.
(http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rcsourccs/ publications/ stateme11t..0LbesLpracuccs.
inSair_usc/) suggests an even more vigorous future for fair use.
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The same characteristic that makes decentralized peer-to-peer technology socially valuable - the b reathing room it provid es through its lack of a
central clearingh ouse or bottleneck - makes it costly for copyright owners.
Because such tec hnology is decentral ized, it provides no easy way to sto p
copyright infringement, even whe n it's happening. That m akes it hard to
integrate a dece ntralized syste m in to a p ay-to-play system. There 's no central location at which to check that payment is being made, o r to stop the
copying if payment is lacking.
The lack o f centralized control a lso makes it questionable to impose liability on the technology's develope rs when its users copy without paying.
Because the developers likely d o no t even know of the infringing behavior
prior to its occurring, and may never learn of it, th ey may have no way to
stop the infringeme n t. 2 !1 Yet, from a consequen tialist perspective, their lack
of kn owledge or contro l over individual infringing acts may be irrelevant.:1"
As the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: 'When a widely shared service or product
is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to e nforce rights in the
protected work effectively against all d irect infringers, the only fmutical altPr11ative being to go again st the distributor of the copyin g device for secondary
liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringeme nt' ( Droksll'r at
125 S. Ct. 2776; emphasis added).
G ROKSTE R

As me ntioned above, decentralized systems have immense positive potential,
but they can indeed a lso empower massive copyright violations. In GrokslPr
the U.S. Supreme Court thus had to face a difficult set of conflicting imperatives. How important is copyright after all? Should copyright be a tail that
'''ags t he cultural/political dog? Did the Court want to outlaw any tcchnoloi:,ry
that uses the privacy-preserving tech nology of decentralized peer-to-peer?
Did it want to preserve such technologies. so long as they were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses? Unfortunately, instead of directly facing the
conscquen tialist issues, t he Court switched tactics, and, as Tim Wu argues,
employed a ' bad actor' approach.:i'
Until the Grokstercase, the dominant fo rmula used to judge th e legality
of decentralized technologies was the formula j ust mentioned - wh ether
·~ It was this rationa le that persuaded the U.S. Court of Appeals for the !':inth Circuit to gi\'c
a judgment to Croluter. The U.S. Supreme Court re,·crscd this, handing down a ruling that
fa\'ored th e copyright ow11crs.
3
" lnterestingl)', the U.S. Supreme Court substituted for their lack of knowledge re indi"idual
infringements, a finding that the developers 'intended to induce' infringement in general.
This is a deontological concept, arguably enlisted to serve the utilitarian end of increa.~ing
•
the amount of copyright enforccmenL
31
Sec generally T im Wu (2005) (distinguishing 'bad actor' from 'welfarist' approaches). Wu
criticizes the Court for taking this approach. My chapter's anal~·sis of Grokstl'Tcan be seen as
a response to Wu, for I ask: Might the Court's use ofa ' bad actor' approach be defended on
philosophical grounds?
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the technology is 'capable of substantial non infringing uses'. This became
known as the Sony formu la, after the case where it was first enunciated.32
If a technology was capable of substantia l noninfringing uses, then under
the Sony formula, the technology was (one thought) immune from liability
and inj unction. This was the formula that kept videocassette recorders free
of copyright liability, even though people sometimes use them to infringe
copyrights.:l:l
How did the U.S. Supreme Court in Groksterhandle the issue of secondary
liability fo r technology? First, the Court refused to admit that anything of
political significance could be lost if the technology were held liable. The
Court paid only limited attention to non infringing uses, and its tone in doing
so was sometimes mocking: 'Use rs seeking Top 40 songs ... or the latest
release by Modest Mouse, are certain to be far more numerous than those
seeking a free Decameron ... •:1-1 Second - and this is the part of particular
philosophical interest - the Court borrowed from the language of agentrelative morality. Instead of weighing the consequences of enjoining35 the
dece ntralized technology, the Court shifted to the language of 'intent'. It
held that 'one who disu·ibutes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright . .. is liable for the resul ting acts of infringement by third
parties'.:l1i Tim Wu has criticized the Court for having sought an 'easier
way out'.37

OVERVI EW OF THE REMAI N I NG ARGUMENT

In the beginning of the chapter, I e m phasized the difficulty of the empirical and methodological questions a consequentialist would have to answer.
Might the Court's shift to more deontological measures of morality such as
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Sludios, Inc.. 4 64 U.S. 4 17, io4 S. CL 774 ( 1984).
It is 1101 copyright infringement to use a VCR 10 make pri\-,He copies of copyrighted works al
home for purposes of time shifting; it can be cop)•righ1 infringement 10 use a VCR to make
copies of fil ms for commercial pu rposes.
34 Croksterat 125 S. Ct. 277 4 .
3 ;; The plaintiffs had sought damages and an injunction. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 al 27_7 1·
Although the U.S. Supreme Coun's opinion did not address 1he issue of whether g".4nung
an injunctive remedy would be appropriate, 1he opinion is likely 10 lead to an injuncuon on
remand.
6
3 Groksterat 125 S. Ct. 2770 (empha~is added ).
. .
3 i Tim Wu (2005, p. 24 1) writes: 'Both sides warned of the terrible consequences ofadJusung
the Sony rule. The recording induSU'}' and some academics warned of chaos 1haunightauend
adopting an expanded Sony that declared Orokster legal. On the other side. the computer
hardware, software, and electronics industries a nd others warned ofihc toil and trouble that
would attend the destruction of their beloved Sony safe-harbor. Whatever the Court di.d with
•·- 1t
· was sure, or so th e arruc1
· · seemed to suggest, would make 1.,
.,,,ny
Lie ·m Am e n·ca unlivable .
Meanwhile there was a much easier way out. ... The Coun created a teSL designed to catch
com panies wi th a bad attitude'.
3•
33
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'intent'38 constitute an improvement rather than an error in its copyright
jurisprudence?39 On the one hand, the closer the statutory legal duties track
the duties that might be deontologically imposed, the more sense it would
make for the U.S. Supreme Court to use a deontological approach when
'filling in the blanks' on matters, like secondary liability, that the copyright
statute does not specifically address. On the other hand, the further the
positive legal duties diverge from the deontological, the more the Court's
apparent deontological approach would appear inconsistent with the statute
the Court is interpreting. Therefore, I will look at two issues:
First, could a deontological approach impose moral duties on any copyist<;
and their helpers?
Second, would these duties be coterminous with the legal duties that
copyright statutes currently impose?
I will suggest that the first question (whether there can be any deontological duties not to copy) sh ould be answered in the affirmative. I will employ
as our vehicle an interpretation ofJ ohn Locke's labor theory of property,
a theory often viewed as deontological."0 Under this theory, I will suggest,
some copyist behaviors would be prima facie4 1 immoral on deontological
grounds.4~ These are acts of copying that occur despite the fact that the
38

Intent also can have consequences. For example, someone with an intent to do X is
more likely to accomplish X than someone who lacks the intent, aud this, in turn, may
alfect the appropri ate sanction. See Kenneth Simons (1992) and Wu (2005 pp. 24g251).
39
Wu (2005, pp. 251 - 255) also notes the difficulry of the empirical questions, and raises
interesting questions of institutional competence.
40
See, for example, Kramer 2004, pp. 128-129. According to Kramer (p. 129), the deontological approach allows Locke 'to justify the specific links between persons and the products
which they had shaped.'
1
' Some acts of intentional harming may be prima facie wrongful, but morally permissible
on an all-Lhings<onsidered basis. For example, twisting a child 's arm might be justifiable
if necessary to save lives. For another example, Anglo-Amcrica11 law provides a general
liberty to inflict competitive hann, perhaps because an opposite rule would have deleterious
consequences. This chapter does not need to face the question of whether consequences
are ever capable of defeating a deontological duty.
42
Locke's property theory has many s1tands, some of which are o\·ertly utilitarian and others of
which dr..twon notions we would todayidentifyasdeontological. See Simmons ( 1992, pp. 3g43) (noti ng affi n ities and differences between Locke and Kant). In this chapter, I articulate a
deomological argument that appears capable of standing on its own, and that seems capable
of generating prima-facie rights and duties that would make it wrongful to e ngage in some
acts of nonconsensual or uncompensated copying. Seana Shiffrin has argued that Lockc·s
general property argumen ts do not justify strong private rights of exclusive control over
intellectual products. See Shilfrin (2001, pp. 141- 143). She reads the text of the Treatises as
'begin (ning] with a common property presumption· that yields private property only 'when
full and effective use of the property requires private appropriation' (2001, pp. 161-162).
Because she sees most intellectual products as being fully usable without private rights of
exclusion (2001, pp. 156-157) ,shc would characterize those products as not being th e 'son·
of things which are appropriable.
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copyright claimant has left 'enough , and as good' in the common for all to
use.43 Although when the 'enoug h, and as good' proviso is unsatisfied an act
of copying would be prima facie moral rather than immoral;44 some copying
would violate Lockean norms if the proviso is capable of being satisfied at
least sometimes. Therefore, a deontological approach that is agent-relative
and nonmaximizing45 could impose moral duties on some copyists and,
potentially, on their helpers.
As for the second question (consistency between a Lockean approach
and what has been enacted in positive copyright legislation), it may appear
at first glance that this question, too, can be resolved affirmative ly. Because
copyright law permits new artists to independently use the same public material that their predecessors used, the law's operation seems to leave 'enough,
and as good' even after copyright is granted. However, I \\rill argue that a
rule that permits independent reuse of public domain material does not
suffice to guarantee that 'enough, and as good' will be left. This is so even
when the mate rial copied would never have existed but for the efforts of
the copyright claimant. Positive U.S. copyright law thus has the potential
for markedly dive rging from a Lockean pattern.
I then examine whether one can reformulate the 'enough, and as good'
criterion into a matter of intent, and if so, whether that interpretation would
bring copyright law in general, or the Grokster opinion in particular, into
closer alignment with the Lockean a pproach. I conclude that a subset of the
cases thal satisfy the proviso can indeed be restated in terms of 'intent', but
that this does not suffice to bring Locke and positive U.S. law into alignment.
Her read ing is intriguing, and like mine results in Lhe conclusion that violating copyright
law is not eq uivalent to violating Lockean natural law. However. Shiffrin's argument works
only against strong intellectual property rights ( 200 1 , p. 14 2 ) . and Lhe Court in Grokstrr
could have premised its notion of wrongfulness on breach of a narrower natural dut)'· for
example. to pay compensation.
.
Shiffrin's goal, like mine, is not to predict ' what John Locke, the person , wo~ld slly
(200 l , p. 141), but raLher to explore what appears most valid and fundamental in his work.
l see Locke's concern with equali ty as more fundamental than his concern with common
ownersh ip.Shiffrin (2001, p. 162) may in fan agree. I argue for an approach thacimple~enr.s
Locke "s concern with equality more directly than does Shiffrin 's test for Lockean pn\'ate
property. See, i11fra, the section titled. ' In ten t and the Lockean proviso.'
.
43 The condition that 'enough, and as good' be left is known a~ the Lockean proviso, and 15
discussed at some length below.
H An example might be copying done w remedy an injury inflicted by the laborer's work or
by her property claim.
. .
15 h might legitimately be objected that Locke's labor theory a lso contains consequenu~hst
elements. Yet for purposes of analyzing Crokster, two aspects of the typical deontological
approach particularly interest u s: rights and duties bei ng Jinked w a particular person
because of who he is or what he h as done (a perspective that is agen t-relative), and whe~her
moral reasons for action are inde peudent of whelhe r the action will maximize 3 gt\'Cll
consequence (a perspec1ive that is nonmaximizing). As Locke's labor th eory of P_ropcr~·
shares is both agent-relative and nonrnaximizing, it fiL~ th e definition of deontological this
chapter h a~ stipulated .
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Therefore, if the intentional acts on which the Court premises secondary
liability do not necessarily amount to dcontological wrongs, the Court needs
to give another reason for abandoning consequential reasoning and taking
refuge in an 'intent' test. That alternative justification it has not provided.
A DEO NTO LOGICAL APPROACH TO COPYRI GHT

In examining the nonconsequcntialist justifiability of copyright, let me
briefly identify three of the many potential streams of analysis: what lawyers
know as 'personhood' theories that are used by some commentators to link
works to their creators; libertarian theories; and Lockean labor theory.
The legal commentators who link copyright to notions of personhood
and Hegelian philosophy usually focus on the authorial person claiming
copyright, emphasizing the integrity, autonomy, personality, and will that
an author can express through controlling a work of authorship. Contrary implications could flow from this su"and of analysis~ 6 by, for example, examin ing how the ability to use copyrighted material can affect the
integrity, autonomy, personality, and will of audiences and follow-on ere~
ators. Although the very notion of authorship has been harshly criticized,
this strand of argument is usually associated with strong property rights and
moral rights in authors.
Another possible approach , sometimes lin ked with libertarianism, argues
that people are not entitled to be paid for the 'fruits of their labor' except
to the extent they have preexisting contracts with the people who consume
those fruits. Under this view, a proper respect for the autonomy of each
individual copier or user requires not imposi ng on that person an obligation to which the individual has not consented. Under such an approach,
therefore, an inventor or wtiter who sells her invention or manuscript takes
the risk that others will be able co copy it. and sell in competition with her,
unless those others have agreed with h er not to do so. It is the responsibility
of the author or inventor to find patrons or purchasers in advance, if she
wishes to be paid for what she has produced. Under this kind of view, neither
the down loaders of music, nor the technologies that they use, have violated
any duty (except perhaps the prima facie duty to obey the law, which is a
separate topic in itself) if they have not themselves made prior promises to
refrain from copying.47
Drahos suggests that Hegelian anal)'Sis does not support allowing 'a certain clas~ of personali1y (authors, artists) .. . to make claims that other property-<>wning moral agents cannot"
( 1996, p. 80). He also argues that 'properry in abstract objects increases the capacity ofowners to place restrictions on the use of physical objects' ( 1996. p. 87). and that intellectual
_ property rights can 'threaten the ethical life of individual comm uni tic~· ( 1996. p. 9 1).
41
For a counter-argument to this libertarian position, see Co1·don ( 1989, pp. 141 !1- 1436). for
a libertarian attack on copyright that emphasizes the primacy of tangible o,·er intangible
property rights, see Palmer (2002).
4

t;
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The Hegelian and libertarian approaches lie ou tside our current scope.
A primary issue for copyright today is how to allocate reward and control
between creative generations. J ohn Locke is the theorist who most explicitly addressed what rules should govern th e relationships between an early
appropriator who takes some of the common for himself and a later comer.
Many nonconsequentialist approaches would impose on the public some
duties not to copy. Probably most observers have little problem with the
argument that authors and inventors deserve some reward, and that, at least
under some circumstances, users have some moral du ty to provide reward,
even if no contracts exist. As has often been obser ved, the larger problem
is going from a moral claim to reward, to a moral claim to full pro perty
rights.
As Edwin Hettinger has argued, if a group of people arc trying to lift an
automobile, and another comes over to assist, shou ld the last person get all
the credit if it is his addition that makes it finally possible to lift the car? 48
Hettinger's analogy is imperfect, yet it has some 'fi t '; as the last-comer built
on the efforts of the other participants, all creative people build on what
came before.
The usual term for the common heritage which all people are free to use
is 'the public domain'. Consider how much each m usician and other artisc
builds on his predecessors - on the people who invented the artistic genre
the artist works in, the instru ments the artist plays, the familiar patterns
of chord changes that a new composer of popular music adapts to her
own uses. Given all that, how can it be said that a musician or composer
is morally entitled to 'own' the mixture of new and old which he calls his
work of auchorship? Might the public morally own most of what musicians
and com posers call their own?
T he issue of 'how m uch credit' or reward is deserved is sharpened by
exami ning the issue of whether natural rights and d uties constrain individuals in how they use the commo n . Whether o r not such constraints apply
is usually stated in terms of whether no one owns the scientific and cultural heritage on which creative people build (which would be to characterize it as a 'negative' common), or whether everyone owns that heritage (a
'positive' common) (Drahos 1996, chapter 3; Thomson 1976, p. 664). 49 _If
we all own that heritage, then arguably we all should have some rights in
what the heritage prod uces. lf so, a private right of ownership that excludes
other commoners would seem hard to justify, except in the un likely event
·18

'A person who re lies on h uman in tellectual h istory and make8 a small modification to
prod uce something of great value should no more receive what the market wi ll bear than
should the last person needed to lift a car receive full credit for lifting it' (Hettinger i9S9.

p. 38).
-19 But sec ShifTrin (2001, p. 149), who suggests that the proviso 'could as easily ha\'e been
posited from a no-ownership staning point - motivated by concerns of fairness about who
should come 10 own the unowned'.
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that Lhe private claimant could o btain universal consent from all the other
commoners.5°
The most familiar theory to tackle a varian t of thjs dilemma isJohn Locke's
labor theory of property. He argued that under some circumstances, a pe rson could justifiably take resources out of a common given to all mankind,
and own the resources privately. The circumstances that make such an enclosure rightful are, inter a lia, that the claimant has mixed the resources from
the common with her own labor (for copyrighL, read 'labor' as 'creativicy'), and that in claiming the piece of common for her own, she leaves
'enough, and as good' for others. Locke believed that the earth was originally owned by 'aJI in common' (a positive communi cy)5', and arguing for
such co-ownership consl.ituted part of his resistance Lo the divine right of
kings. Yet, Locke's conte mporaries believed that private ownership of land
was justifiable, and Locke himself wished to believe Lhat people in a state of
nature who chose to enter civil government owned individualized private
'property' for whose stewardship they could hold government accountable.
How could Locke square privaLe owne rship ofland with a natural state where
the whole earth was owned in common? His analytic solution is now known
as the 'proviso' or 'sufficiency condition '.
The basic stru cture of his argument has two implicit stages. Th e first stage
is centered on the laborer. Labor is mine and when I appropriate objccLs
from the common I join my labor co the m in a purposive way (Becker 1977.
pp. 32-48). If you take the objects I have gathered you have also taken my
labor because I have mixe d my labor with the objects in question. ' [N) o one
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, o r Possessions' (Locke
1988, p. 271, bk. II, §6). To take my labor harms me and you should nOl
harm me. You, therefore , have a duty to leave t.hese oqjeclsalon e. Therefore,
I have a prima facie pro pe rty in the objects. The secon d stage is centered
on persons o ther than the laborer. j ust as the laborer has a natural right
not to be harmed, so do the other commoners. Th erefore, when someone
employs her labor to make the land or its fruits useful, 'mixing' her labor
with the common , her private claim over the resulting mixture matures into
a right only frravided that she leaves 'enough, and as good' for the other
commoners.52
50

5

'

2
;

This was Filmer's argument in Patriarcha:. tha1 we know th at the eanh was 1wt given to all
men in common, but only to roya lty, because initial co-ownership would be inconsiste nt
with contemporary private property. If all persons owned the earth, private property could
never exist because all the commoners would not consent to an y one of them having priv,ue
dominion. By conu-ast, vesting ownershi p in royalty eliminates the coord ination problem.
The Lockean common did not strictly follow the mode l of positive community as set out by
Pufendorf. Rather, as Shiffrin observes, the Lockean common "is available to noualtering
use by each and a ll' complemented with a "righ t over exclusive use' that is "jointly owned'
(2001, p. 150).
Locke argued against Filmer that unanimous consent was not. requ ired before one c~
owner appropriated in circumstances where the complainer had 'as good' available. In
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If the claimant's appropriation leaves 'enough, and as good', Locke
reason s, then only the envious would object (and Locke cares nothing
for objections of the envious) .53 If the claimant leaves 'enough, and as
good', her appropriation 'does as good as take nothing at all' (Locke ig88,
p. 29 1, §33) .5 4 The requirement that private property come into being only
if the private appropriation leaves 'enough, and as good' for all the other
commoners, is the proviso.
The proviso has additional functions within Locke's argument. For example, a principle that property results from mixing labor with the common
could be absurdly overbroad, and the proviso that appropriations must leave
behind 'enough, and as good' usefully limits the amount of property that
can be claimed by an individual.
Thus, Robert Nozick famously asked 'if I own a can of tomato juice and
spill it into the sea ... do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?' (Nozick 1974, p . i 75). Once the proviso is added,
Nozick's hypothetical is no longer so problematic. Artists like Christo are
famous for their work in public spaces, stringing fences or wrapping areas
of landscape. Suppose Christo hires tankers to stir tomato-colored dye into
a bay, with the aim of changing the color of the water to complement the
sunset one fine summer evening.i">!i The artist would seem entitled to keep
everyone else out of the colored area temporarily, to preserve his handiwork
from being marred, provided that the world offers the other ocean users boaters, swimmers, aestheticians, and water skiers - equally good and convenient areas of ocean for their use.
Some have argued that in the cases of copyright and patent the 'eno~gh,
and as good' proviso is easily satisfied.56 This is facially plausible, given
such circumstances, the complainer was merely 'covetous' and 'quarrelsome' (Locke 1988.
p. 291, §34).
;,3 'Cod gave the World .... To the use of tJ1e Industrious and Rational . . . not to the Fancy or
Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious' (Locke 1988, p. 291. §g4).
54 h may be wondered, what happens if the laborer's appropriation would cause harm. but ihe
stranger's copying would also cause harm? The structure of Locke's argument suggests th.e
law of nature should create no property right in this case. In another setting. I defend ibis
result on the ground that it is less important to prevent harms by individuals acting al?ne.
than it is for the law of nature itself to assist in the doing of hann (Cordon 1993. P· 1s61 ) ·
55 For an analogous piece of an, see the photographs of 'Surrounded Islands' at
hup://www.christojeanneclaude.net/si.html.
.
5 6 Interpretations of Locke's proviso vary widely. (See, for example, Fisher (2001 ) discussing
the proviso in the context of intellectual proper[)•.) On one interpretation. for example.
the proviso constrains only minimally; it pennitS privatization of the common whenever the
results of the privali7.ation make non-Owners better off than they would be in a rude state
of na1ure where no such privatization were permitted. Such an interpretation privileges.the
' fi rst to grab' . An oth er ·in terpretauon,
·
put forward by Michael 0 tsu ka, ·is more egalitarian:
'You may acquire previously unowned worldly resou rces if and only if you leave enoughs~
that everyone else can acquire an equally advantageous share of unowned worldly resources
(Otsuka, 2003, p. 24).
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that someone who makes a derivative work building on the public domain
gains no rights in the underlying materiaJ.5i Thus, for example, when
Richie Valens made a rock version of the folk song, La Bamba, his copy·
right extended only to what he added; others could sing the public domain
song without Jiability5 8 and even obtain copyright in their own arrangement
of the public domain song.59 Similarly, obtaining a patent in a new method
of turning wind in10 energy leaves the public unimpeded in its ability to use
whatever the prior art taught about the construction of windmills. Copy·
right Jaw even allows the newcomer freedom from liability if he produces
something t hat duplicates the copyrighted work, provided the second artist
came to th e duplicate result indcpcndently. 60 Thus, copyright seems to leave
'enough, and as good' of the common heritage - in fact, it seems to leave
the common heritage itse lf intact.
Similarly, many observers see what the creative p erson adds as a mere
boon. For Locke, strangers in the absence of exigency or waste have 'no
right' to 'the benefit of another's Pains' (Locke 1988, p. 29 1, §34). They
only have rights to be protected from h arm, and keeping them from a
mere boon arguably causes no harm. Such a claim has been made about
patent law: 'If the patented article is something which society without a
patent system would not h a,·e secured at all- the inventor's monopoly hurts
nobody ... his gains con sist in somelhing which no one loses, even while he
eajoys them' (Cheung 1986, p. 6).0 ' In another conn ection, J ohn Stuart
Mill observed that no one ever ' loses' by being pro hibited from 'sharing
in what otherwise would not have existed at all' (Mill 1872, p . 142). But is
this true?

use ~to~(h): 'The rnpy• i){hl i11 a
compilation or deri,•.tlh-c work extends o nly to the material contributed by tht· a111hor of
such work. as distinguished from the prct•xisting material e mployed in the work. a11d dot·s
not imply any exclusive right in thr preexisting material".
;K Valens may have an effecti,·e 111011opoly on all rock versions of the song, however, bccau~e
courts or juries might erroneously cu nclucle as a factual matter that all other versi on~ copied
from Valens's hit. Jn American coprright law. e'·en subconscious copying can give ri'e to
liability. The possihilicy of fact-finding errors of this kind gi\'ing ri~e to an efTecti,·e monop<>I)'
creates additional problems for the proviso.
59
Ii l lSC § 103.
r.,T1··
·
· patent owners the rig
.h l lo sue even
us •snot necessarily true of patent. Many nauons
give
indcpende11t creators: an inventor who is second-in-time, but has borrowed nothing from
the inventor who preceded him . nevertheless is subject to injunction. In such cases. the
second, indepcnde11t i1wentor certainlr seems to lack 'enough, and as good· . h requires
some procn1stea11 argument 10 suggest that the proviso is 1101 \iolated. or for that matter,
that the patent owner has any ' labor-based righ~' Lhat would justif)" his control O\'Cr the
independent inventor. See. for example. Becker ( 1993, p. 609): under the "icw he explores,
' au1hors who ca n sh ow 1heir intellectual independence from patented products [sh]onld
, be entitled to share the property righL~ in them'.
6
Cheung go<'s on to note that contemporary economic scholarship recogn izes th al th e pawnt
system imposes significant social costs.
~; In the liniLC'd States, this rule linds expression in 17
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In making arguments about harm or loss, one must specify the baseline
against which harm is measured. One baseline worth exploring is the level of
welfare that the accused person had before the inventor/artist created and
claimed ownership in her work. 62 By such a measure, it is not true that the
creation of new inventions and works of authorship are necessarily harmless.
Arguments like this - that no one ever 'loses' by being prohibited
from 'sharing in what otherwise would not have existed at aJI' (Mill 1872,
p. 142) -overlook the way that creation of a new book or invention changes
the social world, potentially impairing the value of the heritage, or causing
other negative changes which only a freedom of copying can redress. Once
an intellectual product influences the stream of culture and events, excluding the public from access to it can do harm. The same things may be in the
common, but they may no longer be 'as good'. If a creative laborer changes
the world, she should not be able to control what others can do to defend
themselves from the change.
There is no way to avoid this harm by relying on the audience's foresight. How could we feasibly ask, ' Would you have wanted to be exposed to
the work, knowing as you now do what it contains and that it comes with
restraints on its reuse?' She could not answer without presupposing knowledge of ~every son she is supposedly deciding whether or not she wants to
acquire.h3
Moreover, we are ordinarily unable to choos<' wh~ • we will encounter,
either in the realm of culture or of science. What looks like a boon can be
(all things considered) a harm.
For example, assume that A takes substan ces from the common. From
these, with great ingenuity, she manufactures an enzyme that greatly
improves healch. Because of its salutary propenies, a decision is made tO
include the enzyme in the drinking water.
The benefits, however, come al the cost of a particular form of addiction:
some people who drink the enzyme become unable to metabolize carbohydrates without continued intake of this elixir. To people so affected, much
ordinary food becomes valueless for nourishment - it is useless unless eaten
along with the enzyme. In such a case, the fact that the common continues to
have an ample supply of both food and the elements from which the enzyme
can be made is not sufficien t to protect the public from harm. The addict~d
public also needs A's knowledge of how the enzyme is manufacwre?, for
without it, they will starve in the midst of plenty. If, after the enzyme is put
into the water supply, the inventor is given a right to prohibit others from
lh

Th e ·issue o f w h a1 consu1mes
·
· · I· See Simmons
a proper comparison is noLoriously con1ro..-ers1a
..

( 1992. P· 294). In pan, for reasons discussed in Gordon ( 1993, pp. 1570-1571). I cxamuie
whelher an individual non-<>wner would have been beuer off never having been affecicd b~
· or
a work, as compared lo how he fares after being affected by (and barred from cop)ing
. adapling) a particular expressive work.
0
:J This is closely rela1cd 10 lhe Arrow paradox.
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using her manufacturing technique, addicted members of the communicy
are worse off in the ir abilicy to use the common than they were before.H-i
Thus, the mere presence of abundant raw materials should no t suffice to
give A a right to exclude B and other strangers from the enzyme or from
learning how it can be made. Giving A ownership of the enzyme or a pate nt
over its method of manufacture would cause harm. Even if A's appropriation leaves 'as much' for others, it do cs not leave 'enough , and as good'.
I would argue that mere quantitative identicy is not enough. 6 5 T his is esse ntially a re liance argument; having changed people's position, the inventor
cannot then refuse the m the tools they need for thriving under their new
condition.
Autho rs no less than inve ntors are capable of changing the value of the
common. Consider how the best-selling novel Cone with the Wind ro manticized the practice of slave holding. Someone entran ced by the nove l's dramatic love story might fi nd herself drawn into the narrator's assumptions
about slavery; the reader's views of he r own ancestors and of her nation's
history (matters that lie in the common) might be negatively a ffected in a
way that mere factual knowledge could not alone undo. To undo the novel's
visceral effects, she mig ht need to write or read a corrective that revisits the
images or personages of the original. This is what author Alice Randall did in
her novel, The Wind Done Gone. she wrote a book that took some of the Gone
with the Wind characters and events, and recast them from an Afro-American
perspective.
Sometimes the law must permit66 re-use of authored work to avoid a
historian or novelist permane ntly changing people's understanding of their
heritage in ways that will devalue the common. 67 Current copyrig ht law d oes
not consistently permit such re-use. American law sometimes allows copyisL'I
6

~ Nole that appealing to lhe public's ability lo use the common {rather than it:. owne rship o f
. the common) is a controversial step .
ti; At least, th is is how I interpret the proviso ( 1993, pp. 1562-1573). As John Simmons says.
· /lieither the quantitative nor lhe qualitative aspects of the requirement I oflc.:aving "enough.
and as good") wears its mean ing on its face · (Simmons 1992, p. 295).
li6 H anns caused by ex pression raise institutional and free-speech issues beyond the scope of
the inst.ant paper. Neverlhcless, the following distinction should be noted. The question is
not whether the harms done by Cone with the Wind justify punishing its author or ce usoring
the book. Rather, the question is whelher the aulhor of a harmful book should be given a
property r ight that would affirmatively stop harmed parties from re-using the book to undo
th e i1tjury done them. I argue lhat the proviso should be interpreted to stop a p roperty right
of the latter kind from arising.
67
Said Alice Randall, •My book is an an t.idote to what I perceive as the poison of the C011e with
I~ Wind text' (Aliet Rimda/l ·speakingfrt!ely ' transrript) . Randall's book was initially enjoined
as a copyright infringement, and removed from boo kstore shelves. Although the injunc tion
was later lifted, Lhe episode demonstrated a danger that copyright can pose. See SunTrust
Bank u Houghton Mifflin Co.. 136 F Supp 2d 1357 (N D Ca 2001) (enjoining product.ion,
display, distribution, advertising, sale, or offer for sale of TM Wind Do11L Cone), rev'd, 268
f'3d 1237 (11 th Cir 2001) and 252 F3d 11 65 ( 11th Cir 2001 ).
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a privilege akin to self-defense under the doctrine of 'fair use' ,68 but 'fair
use' and related doctrines fall shorl of preserving the necessary liberty.6 9
Therefore, it appears that American copyrig ht law fails to track a Lockean
approach.
I NT ENT ANO THE LOCKEAN PROVISO

If the law of nature prohibits the d oing of harm, we are en titled not to have

our ability to use the common be made worse off7° by the laborer's claim
to property. This is an inherent right we would have as humans and not
because of any particular act or effort on our pan.7 1 A Lockean copyright
would arise under this sche ma only as to those pe rsons whose exclusion
from using the work would leave them no worse off (at least in regard to
their ability to use the common) 7 2 than if the work never existed in the first
place.i3 H ow do we identify those persons? How do we know who- if denied
the liberty to copy, adapt, or otherwise make use of the creative laborer's
output - would mere ly be restored to their status quo ante? It is only these
persons who can be justifiably enjoin ed under the Lockean schema.
The key here may be the category so important in Groksler, namely, intent.
Locke suggests that 'enough, and as good' is significant not only in itself,
but, also because when 'enough, and as good' is present, we know something
about the intent of persons complai ning about the appropriation.
Locke writes:
He lhat had as good left for his Improvemen t, as was already taken up, needed not
complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved b)' another's Labour:
6

'[A] n individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory infonnation about
himself may copy such parts of the work as arc necessary to permit understandable com·
mcnt". Hustler Magmin.e ln.c. 11. Moral Majority Enc.. 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (gth Cir. tg86).
69 Sec Gordon ( 1993).
70
One can debate how broadly to interpret both the (prim ary) right aga inst ha rm and the
(derivative) proviso against harm. j o hn Simmons, for example, suggests that some competition (and thus some harm) might be rightful under Locke's natural law, Sim mons ( 199 2 ·
P· 7 J) As for the proviso, Simmons suggests that ' Locke is prohibiting appropriation Iha~
denies others an opportunity equal to one's own for se!f:preservalion and self-goveniment
(1992. p. 292).
71 In Waldron's language, this would be a 'general righL' Waldron ( 1988, chapter 4) explores
the distinction between 'special r ights' that 'arise out of some special transaction or rela·
tionship' and 'general rights' that arc not so li mited. and which apply to everyone. .
;• It may be that the proviso should block the formation of private property when the pn,·ate
claim would cause harm of any kind, an<l not merely when it causes harm to the common.
Such an approach would raise the questi o n of whe ther the Lockean approach can be squared
with tht> general li berty to compete because many inte ntional and even malicious harms are
done in the co urse of socially desirable competitive aCLivity.
73 If my world has changed because of exposure to the work, if I have relied on or ~com.~
affce1cd by it, then denying me the abilicy to copy it freely may make me worse oft than ~
the anist had never labored and the work had never come into existence. In the secon
situation. I would argue, the artist's claim to priva1e ownership is (at bes t) incomplete.
H
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If he did, 'tis plain he desired the benefit of another's Pains, which he had no righl to. a nd
not the Ground which God had given him in common. (Locke ig88, p. 291, §34;
emphasis added)

In this, Locke comes close to abandoning his props of mixing land, and
labor, in favor of making a more general, quasi-Kat1lian point about e thics.
The person who acts for the purpose of taking 'the benefit of another's
Pains' (and no other purpose) we will call ' malicious'. The malicious person violates a deontological constraint when he does intentional harm. It
may be that this constraint mere ly imposes a duty to avoid harm (e.g., by
compensating) rather tha n a full duty to respect intellectual-property rights
but that need not be fatal to the Grokster opinion if the Court was assuming
that harm was done. i<l
The core of Kant's deontological view holds that it is wrong to u·eat
another merely as a means rather than as an end in himself, 'to treat someone as if he existed for purposes he does not share' (Quinn 1992, p. 190
n.25). It denies t.he fundamental equality of persons so lo prefer one's self
over another. As Thomas Nagel notes:
The deomological constrainl. .. expresses the direct appeal to the point of view of
the agent from the point of view of Lhe person on whom he is acting. It operates
through that relation. The victim feels outrage when he is deliberately harmed .. . not
imply because of the quantity of the harm but because of the assaull on his value of
having my actions g uided by his evil. (Nagel 1986, p. 184)

Thus, let us examine copying by an artist/ user who uses a preexisting
work simply to save effort and expense; for this user, the more the other
person has labore d, the better. H e is the person who merely desires the
benefit of the other's 'Pains', and who will not be worse off if copyright is
enforced against him. It is he who necessarily engages in the perversion of
the personal depicted by Nagel.
Nagel gives this example of the 'sense of moral dislocation ' that occurs
when we aim inten tionally at another's harm: An actor wants something whose acquisition will save lives, but can only be obtained by twisting a child 's arm. 'If you twist the child 's arm, your aim is to produce
pain. So when the child cries, "Stop , it hurts!" his objection corresponds
in perfect diametrical opposition to your intention . What he is pleading
as your reason to stop is precisely your reason lo go on' (Nagel 1986,
p. 182).
1
•·

Given Lhe harm-based focus of Locke. o ne could argue that any hnrmles.s intentional copying
is 'rightful' - e\·en when such harmless copying i.~ done by someone who seeks only to take
advmllage of 'another's Pains'. We need not reach Lhis question. As my goal is to reconstruct the best argumenr the Court could ha\'e made for fin ding all infringement-inducers
wrongfu l, I allow arguendo th e assumption that harm was caused by the behavior at issue in
Groks/er.
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Similarly, for the actor I call 'malicious', how does he react when he hears
the laborer cry, 'Stop! I worked so hard on that!' His honest reply would be,
'To take advantage of your hard work is precisely why I seek it'.75
Copyright sweeps everybody into iLS reach. However, it is this first group,
whom I call 'malicious' users, who stand as the target at copyright's conceptual core, if viewed deontologically. 7 6 These persons aim to take for their
own use benefits toward which the author had labored, not lO rectify a harm
inflicted by the work, but simply because using the creation instrumen tall)'
facilitates the user's other ends. In Locke's words, the malicious person is the
person who 'desired the benefi t of another's Pains which he had no right lO,
and not the Ground' (Locke ig88, p. 291, §34) that was the common gift.
Preventing a malicious person from using the work for his own profit
makes him no worse off than if th e pre-existing work had never come to
his notice. Excluding malicious users from the laborer's product stiU leaves
them with 'enough, and as good' as the laborer herself possessed. Denying
them use of a work or making them pay for it simply restores them to their
status quo ante, which is the classic function of corrective justice. As to
malicious users, then, the proviso is necessarily satisfied.
Beyond malicious users, there is a second group, defined by having a
connection with the work itself. In the second group belongs the copying by
any artist/user who has been affected by the prior work in some way other
than a simple stimulated desire to better himself at the other's expense.
Because they do not merely seek the 'benefit of another's Pains', the proviso
might not be satisfied when suit is brought against members of this second
group. From a Lockean perspective, such persons may be entitled to some
freedom to borrow even when their use harms the original author. i7 To such
a 'content-oriented user' , the text is notjust a commodity, an instrument. or
a tool that can be exchanged with other tools. Such a user has an emotional
reaction to the text that is nonfungible. The need to react to the text may
78
involve use of the text; suppressing the need may violate Locke's proviso.
7S

76

77

78

The analogy with Nagel's example is not perfect. The extent of the laborer's 'pains' will
have only an inexact correlation with the value of the work produced. More importanlly.
the child's arm belongs to him more surely than the laborer's effort belongs to the laborer.
The thesis l raise here is, therefore, overbroad unless one accepts with Locke some notion
that the laborer's effort remains ' his' even after the labor is expended - or, allernativel)'.
unless one accepts that the laborer's beneficial acts dcscnie some reward thatthe non laborer
is morally obliged to honor.
This and the following few paragraphs borrow language from my article (Gordon 2004). and
at other point~. the chapter borrows some language from another of my articles (Gordon
1993).
I am speaking here of a Lockean approach. Liberties that might be justifiable un~er. a
Lockean approach might not be j ustified under other, for example, some consequenuahst
approach es.
I do not contend that enforcing copyright will always suppress or distort the nonmalicious
borrower's creative impulse. Some of the nonmaliciow may be proper objects of Lockean
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Do the copyright statutes of any nations limit the imposition of liability
solely to cases where the proviso is satisfied? I know of no such provision.
Do the copyright statutes of most nations limit liability to those copyists who
arc malicious? Again, the answer is 'no'.
Under the American rules that govern direct infringement, liability is
imposed on virtually anyone who copies, regardless of motive. Even having
a reasonable and good faith belief that one is copying lawfully will ordinarily
give no defense to a civil suit. (Such a lack of intent to infringe might help
in a prosecution for criminal copyright infringement,i!l but GrokslPT was a
civil suit.) Therefore, copyrigh t and the Lockean approach again seem to
diverge.
But do copyright and the Lockean approach instead converge in the rare
types of copyright liability (here, a form of secondary liability) that courts
do premise on intent? Grokslerafter all is one such rare casc.8 " The answer
lies in comparing the kinds of intent the Court required in Oroksterwith the
kind of intent that matters under the Lockean approach. For the Lockean
approach, the question was whether the copyist was motivated by the desire
to use another's labor a-; a substitute for his own, a desire to subordinate that
olher person to himself, to use the other merely as a means. For (;rok.1tf"T,
the question was whether the defendant has 'distribute [d] a device with
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright'.111 Are Lhese intents
necessarily equivalent?

LIABILITY FOR TECHNOLOGY

As discussed earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court in OrokstPT seems to have sh ifted
ground from copyright's usual consequentialism to issues of intent. The
Court seems to have switched from a consideration of agent-neutral principles, to an agent-relative emphasis. Presumably it is the defendant's intent
to induce copyright infringement - a bad act - that makes the Court not
care about the technology's potential for good conscquenccs.82
Let us assume arguendo that a deontological constraint (of the kind that
says, for example, 'do not murder') gives rise to a prima facie duty that can
relieve us of any ocherwise-applicable obligation to achieve the highest net
liability- namely, those who copy despite the fact that 'enough and as good' 1>"<1S left for
them.
~9 United Statesv. ~oran. 7S7 F. Supp. 1046. 1049 (D. Neb. 1991).
.
. .
.
' :i\lthough copyrigh1 imposes 'suict liability' on copyists as part of the doctrine of dire.cl
111fringeme111, 'secondary' liabilit}' such as that which is at issue in Groluteris based on d1flcrent rules.
81 Gr; ks
R,
o ter, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
.
. .
. . ..
.
Altemati\'d)', the emphasis on 'intent' may really be an mqu1ry into defendants lineage
(Wu 2005, p. 2 4 3), o r may result from an assumption that 'inducement' 'suggests mass
infringement' (Wu 2005. p. 250).
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balance of good consequences over bad. 8 3 But what is an intent to induce
copyright infringement? Is it an iment to com mit an act Lhat in itself violates
a deontological constraint? If acting with an intent to induce infringement
necessarily amounts to a deontological wrong, then, under our assumption,
the Court was free (at least as a prima facie matter) to disregard consequences. However, if the act of inducement does not necessarily amount to
a deontologic wrong, then the Court needs some other explanation (not yet
supplied) 84 for employing an inqui ry into 'intent' in lieu of undertaking a
full consequentialist inquiry.
Let us look first at the intent invo lved in the under lying direct infringements, that is, the acts by file-traders from which the technology's secondary
liability would be derived. Oirectcopyrig htinfringement (unlike some forms
of secondary liability) is premised on grounds independent of in tent. Further, copyright infringement can be round even when the Lockean proviso
is violated.11;, Th us, a file-trader may be legally liable despite the fact he lacks
the kind of intent Lhat in the Lockean ap proach would subject him to a
duty, and despite the proviso being otherwise unsatisfied. Therefore, e\·en
if one could utilize some kind of d octrine of'transferred intent' to attribute
the direct infringers' motivations to the secondary party, it is not necessarily
true th at one or more of the direct infringcrs had the impro per motivatio n. Some or even most fil e-traders may have had the kind or inte nt that the
Lockean approach would condemn, 81; but this is neilher something that the
Court sought to demonstrate nor is il something that is logically entailed by
the test for secondary liability that the Court used.
What about the intent of the secondary infringer h imself? On the one
hand, he is usi ng others' 'property' for purposes of his own. On the other
hand , as we h ave seen , what the positive law considers to be copyright ' proper ty' is not always 'property' from a Lockean perspective. Therefore, again,
it is d ifficult to be sure that, in a Lockean world, som eone commi ts a dcon·
tological wrong when he faci litates copying.

As mentioned earlier, th is chapter does not need to reach the ullimate question of\\'hether
a deontological duty always carries the day despite consequences. :--/evcrtheless. it is worth
mentioning the classic liter.iry example posing that question. In Dostoyevsky"s Th' 1Jro1hm
Kam"w:.ov. one broLher poses rough I)' the following problem to another brother : "Assume an
evil deity credibly promises you that he will end all suffering exper ienced by all children: No
more hungry ch ildren , or diseased children, or beaten children. But the evil dcit)' specifies
that he will gran 1 this boon to the millions of future children only if yo u kill one innoce nt
chil d. Would you do it?'
1<4 I do not dell )' that precedent provided some support for the Co urt's rule, as did (by analo~·)
a provision in paten t law. But existing prcccclcm cm aid iilso have supported ahcrna tivc ruks.
The question i\ how the Court justified the pa1h it iook.
x.; See Gordon ( 1993).
.
116 Although file-sharers have a personal conneCLion to the work, having a personal connecuon
dOt"S not always gh·e rise 10 a libercy based on the proviso. See note 21, supra.
l!j
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To sum up: when the proviso is violated, copying may be rightful If so,
then having the intent to induce such copying is not necessarily wrongful.
One might argue that the U.S. Supreme Court was acting not against the
purportedly wrongful act of encouraging copying, but against the purportedly wrongful act of helping people to disobey the law. It is certainly possible
to argue that we all have ar least a prima facie moral obligation to obey the
law. Ifso, might one defend the U.S. Supreme Court's Groksterdecision on
the ground that anyone who 'intentionally induces' lawbreaking is committing a deontological wrong? Conceivably. But to make such an argument
would require explanations not ventured in the Court's opinion. 8 7
In its prior decision, Son)'• the Court had decided that, when a technology
presented a mix of lawful and unlawful consequences, the 'capacity for
substantial noninfringing uses' was sufficient to validate the technology's
sunival. ln other words, the lawful consequences trumped the unlawful. In
Grokster, the Court was asked to say more about what counted as this trump:
how to defi ne 'capacity' and 'substanLiality', or to determine what balance
between good and bad effects was necessary before copyright law should
impose liability on a technology. 89 Instead of facing those questions, the
Court reached for a trope. 89
The Court essentially announced that, if a certain kind of intentional
inducement is present, the trumping effect would switch Lo the unlawful
effects: if 'intentiona l inducement' is present, then it is the lawful and beneficial effects that become in-elevant. Thal position would be controversial
even if the Court's test for liability required proof tJ1at a defendant had
committed a deontological wrong. But the Court's test seems to have no
such component. So in the end, I agree with Tim Wu's criticism. One cannot escape the impression, reading the Groksterdecision , that the language
of intent was being used primarily to enable Lhe Court to evade a difficult
choice about what consequences should matter (Wu 2005).

CONCLUSION

Blocking an inquiry into consequences is a serious matter. Yet, in the Grokster
case, the Court ducked difficult questions about consequences9° and instead
imposed liability on the ground that the defendant, Grokster, had 'intended'
to facilitate copyright infringement.
The Cou n does briefly exhibil some concern with the issue of lawbreaking: 'I I 'I ndicali()ns
are that the ease of copying songs or movies using software like Grokster's and Napster"s is
~~ ~ostering disdain for cop)'right protection' (Groks/er, 125 S. Ct. 2i64 at p. 2i75 ) .
See, generally. Wu (2005)
119
Cf. Wu (2005).
9'> For exampl~: \/\'hat kind of efTects should suffice for imposi ng secondary liability? How
rnuch good o r bad did th e Grnkster technology facilitate? Of how much good or bad was it
·
capable?

II;
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T h e Court implicitly mled that consequences didn't matter. Perh aps the
Court believed that a concern with societal effects was trumped by a deontological concern with avoiding ·wrongful behavior.9 1 Ye t, the Court never
really discussed why it thought the 'intentional' act of facil itating infringem e nt was sufficiently evil to render the technology's pote ntia l benefits irre levant. This chapter attempted to fill that gap, d rawin g on Lockean theory
to identify a potentially applicable deontological wrong. The ch apter conclu ded, however, th at the Court's test for secondary liability does not depend
on a defendant committing such a wrong.
The Grokster opinion is thus caught between two stools. h lurches from
consequentialist consid erations (e.g., where the Court says that making
Grokster liable is the only 'practical' thing to do) to what sounds like nonconsequentialist reasoning ('intent'), without at any point either pinning
down the consequen ces at issue, or pinning down a deontological duty that
would b e violated by a d efendant who induced copyrig ht in fringement. The
opinion does justice to neither concern.
That the makers ofa technology intentionally help someone else violate
copyright law h ardly seems like such an evil act that a lawmaking court
sh ould d isregard the beneficial byproducts of the techno logy. Moreover,
the Court's a pparently deonto logical inquiry into ' intent' is engrafted on to
a stalUte that was enacted pursuant to a consequen tialist clause of the U.S.
Constitution. After a ll, Congress is given power over copyright and patent ·To
Promote the Progress of Science and th e useful Arts'. By neither ad mitti ng
or explaining why it was abandoning consequentialism, n or doing a full
consequentialist analysis, the Court comes to a result whose basis is opaque.
This ch apter intends to help show how acknowled g ing the consequentialist/
nonconsequentialist divide can help us reason more clearly.
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